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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Margaret Lea Lewis appeals from the district court's order denying her motion to
suppress evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court found the following facts:
On July 10, 2010, at approximately 23:25 (11 :25 P.M.), Lewis was
operating a 1980 Ford traveling south on Mink Creek Road, Pocatello,
Bannock County, Idaho. Deputy Lovell, of the Bannock County Sherriff's
Department was operating his patrol vehicle in the same vicinity. Prior to
coming into contact with Lewis, Deputy Lovell was also traveling south on
Mink Creek Road. Mink Creek Road has a posted speed limit of forty-five
(45) miles per hour. The road is painted with a center line and fog lines,
with the south bound fog lines located on the right side of the roadway.
Deputy Lovell first observed Lewis' vehicle weaving from left to right
in her lane of travel. He observed the vehicle exit the road way to the right
and come to a stop. Deputy Lovell pulled up behind the vehicle and also
stopped. He activated his rear emergency lights for safety, but he did not
activate his overhead lights. As he exited his vehicle to perform a welfare
check, the Defendant turned on her vehicle's left signal light and then
stuck her left arm out the window. Her elbow was resting on the bottom of
the window frame of her driver side door and her forearm and hand were
pointed upward. Deputy Lovell testified he thought that the Defendant
was making a right tum signal with her arm.
After Defendant activated her vehicle's left tum signal and put her
arm out the window, she then pulled back out onto the roadway and
resumed driving down the road. Deputy Lovell re-entered his vehicle and
began to follow Lewis southbound on Mink Creek Road. Deputy Lovell
testified that he observed Defendant's vehicle swerve right and touch the
fog line, then a few seconds later he observed the vehicle completely
cross over the fog line with its right tire. After crossing the fog line, the
vehicle swerved back into its lane of traffic and then activated its right turn
signal. The vehicle then turned right onto Caribou Road. Deputy Lovell
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activated his overhead lights with the intent to perform a traffic stop at
about the same time Defendant activated the right turn signal. Defendant
stopped her vehicle on the right side of Caribou Road and Deputy Lovell
performed a traffic stop.
(R., pp.89-90.)
On approaching Lewis, Deputy Lovell discerned that she was intoxicated. (Tr.,
p.17, Ls.1-25.) Deputy Lovell placed Lewis under arrest for driving under the influence.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.15-19.) As Lewis had been convicted with driving under the influence at
least twice before, the State charged Lewis with felony driving under the influence. (R.,
pp.35-38.) Lewis filed a motion to suppress the evidence acquired in the traffic stop,
challenging the basis for the traffic stop. (R., pp.54-55.) After carefully reviewing the
evidence presented to the district court, the court found both that Lewis's infraction of
crossing the fog line by itself gave the officer reasonable suspicion to enforce a traffic
stop, and that Lewis's erratic driving pattern gave the officer reasonable suspicion to
enforce a traffic stop based on the totality of the circumstances, and so denied the
suppression motion. (R., pp.88-95.)
Lewis entered a conditional guilty plea to the felony charge of driving under the
influence, reserving her right to appeal from the denial of her suppression motion. (R.,
pp.99-104.)

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Lewis pied guilty.

(R., pp.109-1 O; Tr.,

p.73, Ls.20-23.) The district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Lewis
to a unified term of six years with three years fixed. (R., pp.111-14.) Lewis filed a Rule
35 motion requesting leniency (R., pp.117-18), which the district court granted, reducing
the fixed portion of her sentence to two years (R., pp.119-20).
notice of appeal. (R., pp.122-24.)
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Lewis filed a timely

ISSUES
Lewis states the issue on appeal as:
Mindful of the fact that crossing over or onto the fog line on a
roadway constitutes a traffic infraction, did the district court err when it
denied Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress the State's evidence?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The State rephrases the issue as:
Has Lewis failed to show error in the district court's order denying her motion to
suppress evidence?
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Lewis Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Denying Her Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Challenging only the basis for the traffic stop, and "mindful of the fact that the act

of crossing over or onto the fog line is a traffic violation, Ms. Lewis nonetheless asserts
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to suppress the
State's evidence in this case." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Lewis has failed to establish
error in the district court's correct application of the law to the facts found at the
suppression hearing. The judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the Court] accept[s] the trial court's findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but ... freely review[s] the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 729-30,
117 P.3d 142, 143-44 (Ct. App. 2005). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995).

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Lewis's Suppression Motion
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's

occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable

4

sea:-ches

seizures.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v.

Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). Because a routine
traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is more analogous to an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is analyzed under the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54.
Under Terry, an officer may lawfully stop a suspect for investigative purposes only when
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961
P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998).
Lewis only challenges the district court's conclusion that Lewis's infraction of
crossing over the fog line gave Deputy Lovell reasonable suspicion to enforce a traffic
stop. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) An officer who has observed a traffic infraction,
even if minor and insignificant, has reasonable suspicion to stop the driver who
committed that infraction.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).

As

previously decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 32
P .3d 685 (Ct. App. 2001 ), crossing the fog line, even fleetingly, constitutes a traffic
infraction. The Court said:
Idaho Code § 49-630(1) requires that a vehicle be driven on the right half
of the roadway, except in certain circumstances that are not applicable in
this case. The "roadway" means that portion of a highway that is
"improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." It does not
include "sidewalks, shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way." Accordingly,
when Officer Burns observed Slater's tires cross the fog line, albeit
fleetingly, Burns now possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that
Slater had violated I.C. § 49-630 by driving on the shoulder of the
highway, rather than on the "roadway."
Slater, 136 Idaho at 298, 32 P.3d at 690.
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Slater controls the outcome of this case.

The facts are

dispute:

Lewis

crossed over the fog line. (R., p.93.) Because crossing over the fog line, even if only
fleetingly, is a traffic infraction, Deputy Lovell had reasonable suspicion to stop Lewis.
The judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed.
This Court may also affirm the judgment of the district court on the alternative
basis articulated by the district court below. Lewis does not challenge the district court's
alternative conclusion that Deputy Lovell had reasonable suspicion to investigate the
DUI based on the totality of the circumstances, which included Lewis's swerving prior to
first pulling off the road, her failure to notice Deputy Lovell when he pulled up behind
her, ignoring the officer's arrival as she pulled back onto the road, her continued
swerving after returning to the road, and her driving over the fog line before swerving
back left into her lane. (R., pp.94-95.) Where a basis for the district court's ruling is not
challenged on appeal, the appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. State v.
Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998).

The

judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed.
Lewis has failed to establish error in the district court's correct application of the
law to the facts found at the suppression hearing.

The district court correctly denied

Lewis's suppression motion, and its judgment should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The

respectfully ;equests that this Court affirm the district court's order

denying Lewis's suppression motion.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2011.

~~

'----R~LJ~R
Deputy Attorney General
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Deputy Attorney General
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